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Abstract
This paper analyzes the outsourcing model which Boeing devised to develop its
latest commercial airplane model: Dreamliner (B787). The development of this
airplane which seemed to be very promising in the beginning turned into the
longest delayed program in the history of the company. In this paper, we propose
an integrated outsourcing framework through which we try to find the root causes
of the delays and the resulted extra costs. The proposed framework shows how the
interaction of all influential factors in four outsourcing dimensions (who, what, to
whom, and how) determines the performance of an outsourcing program.

Keywords: Outsourcing; Supplier Management; Boeing; Dreamliner

1. Introduction
On the 29th of January 2003, Boeing revealed the general specification of its latest airplane
design. The new airplane was a fuel efficient jetliner made of mostly composite materials – an
innovative and unparalleled design which the commercial aviation industry had never seen the
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like of it. The plane was eventually dubbed Dreamliner or Boeing 787 (B787). The Dreamliner,
with its appealing and unique features, turned into the most successful release in the history of
commercial aviation industry with a record number of 500 orders within the first three years of
the program’s official launch. Later on, Dreamliner’s orders even exceeded 900 at some point1.
However, the Dreamliner came to be known as the longest delayed program in the company’s
history with more than undesirable consequences, including huge extra costs, lost and delayed
revenues, loss of customers’ and investors’ confidence, not to mention a reshuffle of the top
management.
When the first signs of the problems were observed in 2007, the company started to pour
money and resources into the program. At that time, the top management was under the
impression that they could contain the problem to a six month delay (considering some cushion
for then unforeseen problems). A six month delay might not look unacceptable for a mega
project to develop an extremely complex product. Nevertheless, only the six-month delay
resulted in around $1 billion of extra costs and an estimated reduction of $3.5 billion in revenues
for the consecutive year (Gates, 2007). However, as the subsequent events showed, the roots of
the problems were so deep that they caused more than three years of delay and many times more
extra costs.
In this paper we try to analyze the Boeing’s challenges in this program, which seem to have
roots in the outsourcing model the company established for developing this airplane. Similar to
many other challenging cases in the past, this case supports the idea that outsourcing is a doubleedge sword which can ultimately offer either significant positive business achievements or huge
negative business impacts, depending on how it is designed and implemented.
Outsourcing literature is rich with papers which try to demonstrate the interaction of
influential factors in an outsourcing program – either to explain the outcome or to prescribe an
approach. Most of these papers, however, focus on limited number of factors. In reality, each
outsourcing program is influenced by a network of many influential factors. In some cases,
focusing on a selected number of factors could be misleading – as we will show for the
Dreamliner case. In this paper, we offer a framework which can help us to identify all the
influential factors from a holistic point of view. Using the existing results in the literature, one
1

The number of outstanding orders is a changing figure due to new orders and cancelations.
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can then analyze the interaction of these factors to understand/design an outsourcing program –
again we demonstrate it for the Dreamliner case.
In this paper, we first introduce our framework while reviewing the related literature. We
then provide the case background and our observations in this case. Using this framework, we
analyze the Dreamliner case to find the root causes of the problems. Managerial insights are
provided at the end.
The authors acknowledge that the analysis of a case ex post is much easier than doing so ex
ante. We want to emphasize that this analysis by no means undermines the efforts of executives
and managers at Boeing and the decisions they had to make under very a turbulent business
environment. It is partly through their visions and daring that we can enjoy such advancements in
the commercial aviation field.

2. Related Literature and Conceptual Framework
Outsourcing of a specific business activity can be referred to as the process of transferring the
responsibility of performing a function from internal employee groups to external non-employee
groups (Zhu et al, 2001). Due to its potential benefits, outsourcing has become one of the key
business strategy themes for companies in the last few decades over which the evolution of
outsourcing can be classified into three periods (Hätönen and Eriksson, 2009): the era of cost
cutting by (domestic) outsourcing via arms-length relation (1980s), the era of capability
enhancement by (international) strategic sourcing via strategic alliances (1990s), and the era of
organizational transformation by (global) transformational outsourcing via collaborative
development (2000s).
The evolution of outsourcing has been accompanied by augmentation of outsourcing
variants. This resulted in quite an extensive literature which looks at outsourcing from different
perspectives. In order to gain a comprehensive perspective, capable of capturing all related
factors, we propose a general framework with four outsourcing dimensions. These outsourcing
dimensions are in fact four questions the answer to which can fully characterize all the influential
factors in any outsourcing program. These outsourcing dimensions (questions) are: (a) who
wants to outsource and what are the capabilities of the outsourcing firm? (b) what is being
outsourced and what are the characteristics and complexity of the product or service being
3

outsourced? (c) to whom should a firm outsource and what are the required qualifications of the
suppliers? and (d) how outsourcing is being done and how effective and efficient they are?
Throughout the rest of this section we briefly review the literature related to our case and
show that the existing results can be viewed from the perspective of this framework. In fact, each
paper in the literature tries to explain the relationship between two or more factors in different
outsourcing dimensions. For each paper we specify the dimension(s) under discussion in a
bracket.
Because of the vastness of the outsourcing literature, for the sake of brevity, we focus only
on the outsourcing of design (or R&D) and New Product Development (NPD), which is related
to the case under study in this paper.
Nowadays, many companies have developed competencies in managing NPD projects to
play mainly the role of system integrators. There are others who have kept the development of
few critical components or subsystems in-house and outsourced the development of the rest to
suppliers. All these companies can then enjoy the benefits of outsourcing of NPD which include:
access to a larger pool of resources (either financial or talent) [who & to whom], greater focus on
core competency and customer requirements [who], reduced costs through lower labor and talent
costs [to whom], global growth through access to critical local information and markets [to
whom], more employee flexibility [who] through transferring the responsibility of new
employees to suppliers (Rundquist, 2008), potential profit margin benefits (Calantone and
Stanko, 2007) [who], and lead-time reduction [what].
There are a variety of challenges in outsourcing in general and the outsourcing of design and
NPD in particular. In the past, firms usually prefered to keep NPD processes in-house since its
outsourcing would be associated with future vulnerability of the firm because of either
intellectual property concerns (Munsch, 2004; Roy and Sivakumar, 2011) [who], or dependency
concerns (McIvor, 2005) [who]. However, due to its abovementioned benefits, outsourcing of
design and NPD is becoming more common over time.
For a stronger focus on core competencies, firms are encouraged to consider outsourcing
everything which is not a core competency (Windrum et al, 2009). However, distinguishing core
from non-core compentencies or equivalently determining the scope of outsourcing [what] is not
an easy task. McIvor et al. (2010) proposed a framework which helps to identify what should be
outsourced and what should not. Depending on the relative capabilities of the outsourcing firm
4

[who & to whom] and criticality of the processes to be outsourced [what], the authors propose
four outsourcing options: I) collaborative outsourcing (low capability, critical); II) retain inhouse (high capability, critical); III) transactional outsourcing (low capability, not critical); and
IV) outsource or spin-off (high capability, not critical).
Design and NPD processes require the interaction of cross-functional teams and as such
having effective and efficient communication is both critical and challenging. The required
interaction can be escalated by the complexity of the product or service (Zhao and Calantone,
2003) [how & what]. To facilitate communication, in electronic industry, extended enterprises
have been formed where Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) have extended their
collaboration with companies that manage production, product introduction, and even product
design for the more complex and technologically advanced parts of a product or module
(Johansen, 2005) [how & what]. In fact, the modular nature of products in some industries has let
companies outsource detailed design of components under their general design requirements.
Such a practice [how] has been observed in Japanese car companies (Dutton, 1992), Chrysler
(Minahan, 1998), and Apple (Magee, 1992). When a modular design is possible, the challenge of
dealing with the complexity of the product reduces to the challenge of managing the interfaces of
the proruct sub-systems [how].
In the conventional NPD, we usually observe co-located teams relying on designers and
engineers located in engineering centers. In contrast, nowadays, NPD has more globally
distributed teams using an entirely digital NPD process to facilitate distributed, collaborative
engineering (Eppinger and Chitkara, 2006) [how]. It seems, however, that there is no established
model that describes how this virtual network operates or should be managed (Monroy and
Vilana Art, 2010) [how & to whom]. When it comes to NPD outsourcing of complex products,
co-location of outsourcing firm and suppliers is advised in general design and integration phases
Tripathy and Eppinger, 2011) [how].
Another challenge in outsourcing of NPD is the structure of supply chain. To address the
challenging task of managing a network of suppliers, often delegated sourcing strategy is applied
(Cousins and R. Spekman, 2003) [to whom & how]. This structure has become popular in the
aerospace and automotive industries since the mid 1990s. In delegated sourcing, a few key
suppliers known as first-tier suppliers are each responsible for the delivery of an entire subassembly as opposed to an individual part. The outsourcing firm delegates authority to the first5

tier suppliers to manage the manufacturing of the associated components of the sub-assembly.
Such a structure can be applied when a modular design is feasible. In this approach a first-tier
supplier is, in essence, a strategic partner. This firm designs the sub-systems and develops a
hierarchical network of its own suppliers (Mazaud and Lagasse, 2007) [to whom]. Such a dual
responsibility for the first-tier suppliers is extremely critical in success of such outsourcing
programs. Any shortcoming in qualifications and technical strengths of the first-tier supplier is
potentially transferred to the outsourcing firm and can result in delays and other negative impacts
[to whom].
An influential factor amplifying these outsourcing challenges is the complexity of the
product [what]. Complexity could pose challenges in capacity estimation when launching new
products. This could possibly lead to over commitment situations (Yu et al, 2010) [what & to
whom]. Moreover, complexity of products can cause challenges in having a modular design
which is critical in outsourcing of design and NPD (Langlois, 2003) [what]. To outsource the
design and NPD of complex products, when learning by doing matters, the OEM should retain
some component specific knowledge in-house (Zirpoli and Becker, 2011) [what & who].
Through empirical analysis of 323 projects, Hui et al. (2008) have argued that, due to high
interdependency of activities within stages of complex projects, outsourcing firms suffer from
lack of domination over the activities and as such face challenges in control and monitoring [how
& what]; leading to poor performance. In outsourcing the NPD of a complex product it is
difficult to clearly define the outsourced function or state a clear performance measure (Tadelis,
2007). Moreover, for a complex product, the detailed specification of the product might evolve
as the development program proceeds, which prevents the outsourcing firm from having a welldefined contract. Lack of clarity in the contract is often a source of renegotiations and change in
contract terms, which can result in considerable hidden costs (Tadelis, 2007) [how & what].
Complexity of product can also influence the type of relation between the outsourcing firm
and its supplier. One extreme type of relation known as arms-length or contractual (Kamath and
Liker, 1994) [how] is where suppliers manufacture simple parts, either standard across the
industry or designed by the outsourcing firm. At the other end of the relation spectrum is
partnership in which the supplier is fully integrated into the product development processes of
the outsourcing firm.
6

The contract/relation between the outsourcing firm and suppliers should also provide proper
incentives for the suppliers to exert enough fund and effort [how]. For outsourcing the NPD of
complex products where the scope and performance measures cannot be clearly defined from the
outset, these incentives usually cannot be properly induced through direct payments. In these
cases, other mechanisms such as revenue sharing contracts or royalty payments can be used
(Quinn, 2000) [how].
There is a similarity between our conceptual framework and the classification of literature
proposed by Hätönen and Eriksson (Hätönen and Eriksson, 2009) with the primary difference
that our framework is to be applied for analysis of an outsourcing program while Hätönen and
Eriksson’s classification tries (among other results) to categorize the subjects of the published
articles in the general field of outsourcing. Furthermore, one of our contribution is to highlight
that the interactions of the factors in different dimensions (questions) are extremely critical in the
analysis of an outsourcing program. Hence, these dimensions should be analyzed (questions
should be answered) in accordance with each other. Each of these four dimentions can be
characterized by different factors as is depicted in figure 1 (see also table 1 for the state of each
of these factors in the Dreamliner program). The nature of these factors in each dimension and
their interaction can identify the level of success of an outsourcing program. In our analysis
section , we will show how these interactions resulted in delays and extra-costs in the
Dreamliner’s oursourcing program.
We chose the factors in each outsourcing dimension (figure 1) based on the existing results in
the literature2 and the observations in our case. In fact, each case has its own influential factors
with different levels of importance. What we want to emphasize in this framework is that, in any
outsourcing program, we need to look at the four outsourcing dimensions and characterize the
influential factors of each dimension in that specific case. Then, the interaction of all these
factors should be considered and analyzed to get a complete picture of the performance of the
outsourcing program. As we will show in our case, considering only a limited number of factors
could be misleading.

2

See for example the references mentioned in this section. Monroy and Vilana Art (2010) enumerates ten
outsourcing success factors.
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Figure 1 – Four outsourcing dimensions and their typical associated factors

3. Methodology
In this research we performed an in-depth study of theoretical results in the literature (focused on
outsourcing of R&D and NPD). Based on this study we proposed our conceptual framework. We
also carried out a case study to show how our framework can be applied in practice. For our case
study, we used two sources of data/information: qualitative interviews and published materials.
Specifically, we conducted semi-structured interviews with industry experts and analysts as well
as Boeing’s union representatives. In parallel, we carefully compiled and analyzed all publicly
available data/information including published news, comments, analyses in media and the
company website. Over time, we could gather sufficient information from interviewees and
publicly available materials by realizing saturation in new information. Through the gathered
information and our conceptual framework, we tried to analyze the root causes of this costly and
well publicized delay and its impacts. Our analysis is based on the related events which have
happened by the end of October 2011.
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Despite repeated attempts, probably due to extensive delays and escalation of public
criticisms, none of the key decision makers at Boeing and at the first-tier suppliers were willing
to be interviewed. This can be viewed as one of the main sources of data limitation in our case
study.
There have been many news reports and company media releases since the program was first
announced in 2003, some supported and some criticized the many controversial issues that
surrounded the program. To the best of our knowledge, there has not been any publication which
has a comprehensive and analytical look at the delayed program to date. This article could be a
first attempt at such a comprehensive and analytical look.

4. Case Background
In this section we provide background information on the Boeing Company, its products, the
Dreamliner design, and the Dreamliner program. This background information, which is
presented according to our conceptual framework, provides the context for our analyses which
proceed.

4.1. Who: Boeing, an Extraordinary Company
The Boeing Company is one of the nation’s largest exporters by value (Reed, 2009). It was
founded in 1916 and it is the world’s largest and most diversified aerospace company as of 2010.
Boeing designs, manufactures, and supports commercial jetliners, defense systems, satellites, and
launch vehicles. At the end of 2009, with customers in 90 countries, $34.1 billion of the
company’s sales was from the commercial airplane division, contributing to approximately 50%
of Boeing’s annual revenue3.

4.2. What: Dreamliner, an Extraordinary Design
The Boeing 787 is a mid-sized, wide body, twin engine commercial jet airliner. At the time of
launch, the Dreamliner was rated as the most efficient commercial airplane ever made by Boeing

3 http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/brief.html
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and would be 20% more fuel efficient than similar sized airplanes4. The change from the
traditional hydraulic systems to electrical architecture, higher usage of composite materials
(derivatives of carbon fiber), use of advanced technologies for a better in-flight experience, and
reduced airplane maintenance costs were some of the very notable features of this plane (Hale,
2006).
The usage of composite materials in the Dreamliner’s structure was not Boeing’s first
experience with these exotic materials. The company owns a facility dedicated to this purpose
called Composite Manufacturing Center. What differentiated the Dreamliner’s design from
Boeing’s other models such as B707 and B777, was the extent to which these materials were
used. The extensive use of composite materials makes the Dreamliner 30,000 to 40,000 pounds
lighter than similar aircrafts. It also let Boeing design the structure of the plane from very few
large body parts (sections) which could reduce the assembly time and use much fewer fasteners.

4.3. How: Dreamliner Development Program
Boeing not only introduced a revolutionary product, but also revolutionized the way it developed
the new airplane. The company decided to outsource the manufacturing of the airplane more
extensively. Boeing also outsourced, for the first time, the design, engineering, and integration of
the majority of airplane parts including different sections of the fuselage, the horizontal tail, and
the wings. Although Boeing had the proper capability and expertise within its own engineering
team, the company offloaded the design and engineering phase to suppliers, while limiting its
role mainly to the provider of the general design and the assembler of the sections delivered by
the suppliers. More than 90% of engineering, manufacturing and the integration of the
Dreamliner were outsourced to outside suppliers5. The vertical fin remained the only major part
which was designed and manufactured directly by Boeing.
Boeing named its major suppliers the Global Supply Partners (GSP) since participation of a
supplier necessitates investing its own funds and resources to perform the engineering

4 http://www.boeing.com/commercial/787family/programfacts.html
5

Boeing originally outsourced more than 70% of the design and manufacturing of the Dreamliner to suppliers.
Later on, the company sold of its Wichita and Tulsa plants, increasing outsourcing, according to industry experts, to
more than 90%.
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development and integration. These major supply partners were also called risk sharing partners
since they agreed to receive part of the revenue of selling each airplane as their payment (Drew,
2009a). So, they accepted to share Boeing’s risk in success or failure of the program.

Figure 2: Outsourced parts of the Dreamliner and their suppliers
Source: Seattle Post-Intelligencer
4.4. To Whom: First-Tier Suppliers
The major partners chosen by Boeing were Spirit AeroSystems (USA), Alenia Aeronautica
(Italy), Kawasaki Heavy Industries (Japan), Vought Aircraft Industries (USA), Fuji Heavy
Industries (Japan), and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japan) (Lott, 2010). Figure 2 shows the
sections outsourced to each supplier.

4.5. What Happened
By convincing suppliers to invest their own funds and resources, Boeing managed to cut the
development costs to around 55% of the originally estimated $10 billion budget for the program
(Lunsford and Micheals, 2004). As a result, the GSP model was received very well by the industry

experts, analysts, and even investors. As such, Steven Schaffer, vice president and general
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manager of the GSP at Boeing Commercial Airplanes, was named the supply chain manager of
the year (2007) by the Purchasing Magazine. All in all, everyone seemed to be excited about the
brilliance of the program design.
The events that followed this initial hype, however, proved that neither the outsourcing
model nor its implementation was free of major flaws. Starting in 2007, Boeing faced a series of
problems in its Dreamliner program, which led to a series of delay announcements. Figure 3
shows the timeline of these delays and the announced reasons.

Figure 3: Dreamliner program timeline
Boeing managed to display the first assembled Dreamliner in its roll out ceremony, as it was
scheduled, in July 2007. Boeing insisted on having the roll out on July 8th 2007 since the digits
of this date symbolize the airplane name (07/08/07

787). The B787 which was displayed to the

public in this ceremony was not as complete as it looked. Most of the parts delivered to Boeing’s
assembly facility were incomplete. Engineers and technicians at Boeing had to use temporary
fasteners to pull the parts together for the show. In fact, Boeing rushed the suppliers to deliver
the parts even if they were not complete so that it could keep its promise for the symbolic roll out
date. After another 5 delay announcements, finally, the first Dreamliner took off the ground in
December 2009.
The impact of these delays, which were accompanied by huge extra costs, had many tangible
and intangible impacts on Boeing. As an example, we can look at the possible impact of this
program on the Boeing’s stock performance. Figure 4 shows Boeing’s stock performance
12

compared with its industry average (Aerospace and Defense) from 2004, when the program was
launched, till fall 2010 (both Boeing’s stock price and the industry average are normalized to an
index of 100 at the beginning of 2004).

Figure 4: Being’s stock performance compared with the Aerospace/Defense industry average
Boeing’s stock increasingly performed better than the industry average since the launch of
the program till the roll out date. This was the period of time when the program was mostly
praised and received a record number of orders. The superiority of Boeing’s stock started to
decline after the first delay announcement. This decline continued and in mid 2008 Boeing’s
stock started to actually perform weaker than that of the industry average until late 2009 when
the maiden flight (first take-off) happened and Boeing’s stock managed to gain part of its old
strength. Although Boeing’s stock price might have been affected by internal factors other than
the Dreamliner program, Figure 4 shows that there is a strong correlation between the success
and failure of this program and Boeing’s stock price.

5. Observations
In this section we introduce highlights of Boeing’s challenges in B787 development program and
company’s responses to them. For brevity’s sake, we do not discuss all the documented
problems.
13

5.1. Fasteners problems
One of the first supply chain problems that surfaced in this program was a shortage of fasteners.
In 2007, there was a general shortage of fastener production capacity in the industry (Glader and
Lunsford, 2007). This problem was even worse for the Dreamliner program. The new composite
design needed about 80% fewer fasteners. In addition, the airplane was in the development
phase. So, the orders were for very few numbers of airplanes. The relatively small volume of
fastener orders from the Dreamliner program did not stir an enthusiastic response from the
suppliers who preferred to exploit their limited capacity in larger orders. Hence, it was natural
for the fastener manufacturers to give lower priorities to smaller orders. This situation posed
serious threats to the Dreamliner program (Wallace, 2007).
Following the fastener delay, Boeing and Alcoa planned to develop ways to speed up
production. Alcoa’s plan was to add up to its existing capacity at Mexico and Hungary and also
to open up a new plant in China (Ostrower, 2009). However, the problems with fasteners
continued to haunt the Dreamliner program. On a second occasion, the delay was caused by
improper installation of the fasteners. Due to unclear specifications of how to install these
fasteners, close to 3% of the fasteners installed had to be removed and reinstalled. In response,
Boeing emphasized that they would improve their quality management systems and the training
of workforce on fastener installation (Gates, 2008a).

5.2. Travelled work
Suppliers, who could not complete their parts according to the specified requirements, passed on
incomplete or substandard sections of the airplane to Boeing’s final assembly facility at Everett,
WA. Workers at Everett had to incorporate additional effort to finish the incomplete work. They
named this type of extra work “travelled work.” This was compounded by the problem of
mechanics at Everett having to encounter parts for assemblies sometimes without proper paper
work or even assembly instructions in another language which required translation (Lunsford,
2007).
Boeing had to include travelled work into its already tight production schedule, which
resulted in further delays. For example, flaws in manufacturing of the mid fuselage structures by
Alenia Aeronautica, the Italian supplier, made Boeing to issue a “stop work” order to the
14

supplier. Boeing realized the problem after Alenia had manufactured 23 mid fuselage sections.
To fix the problem, Boeing had to apply patches to the defective areas (Drew, 2009b).

5.3. Problematic sub-suppliers
In GSP model, Boeing for the first time outsourced the sub-systems to its supply partners, and
these partners in turn outsourced different tasks of their contracts to sub-suppliers. The
subsequent events showed that Boeing was not ready to deal with this more complicated supply
chain, nor these sub-suppliers were all able to meet Boeing’s high standards.
For instance, Vought Aircraft Industries, a supply chain partner in charge of building the rear
fuselage of the Dreamliner, offloaded the production of floor grids to IAI (Israel Aircraft
Industries). However, IAI failed to deliver the integrated floor grid of the first Dreamliner on
time. Under pressures from Boeing, Vought shipped the first rear fuselage to Everett which had
only 16% of its structure completed and none of the systems installed. To solve the problem, IAI
was directed to supply unassembled floor grid pieces and as such, after about one year, the
fuselages from the Vought plant were 98% complete by structure and had 87% of the systems
installed, before being delivered to Everett for final assembly (Gates, 2008b).
Another instance rose when Boeing outsourced the Brake Control Monitoring System
(BCMS) to General Electric (GE), who in turn subcontracted the design of the software to Crane
Co. The delivered software caused serious feedback problems at Everett due to the improper test
and verification of the software by HCL, an Indian subcontractor of Crane. Crane accepted the
responsibility and spent many times its initial budget to rework the job. After the problem was
resolved by Crane, Boeing realized that the temperature generated in the brakes was higher than
expected during the taxi testing of the first Dreamliner. They needed to redesign the BCMS;
requiring an additional investment by Crane. This time, however, Crane was not willing to pour
more money into this project. In a legal battle, Boeing was directed to pay $18.9 million for the
redesign cost. It was then decided that Boeing would work directly with Crane rather than with
GE as intermediary (Ostrower, 2009).

5.4. Delays and Shortage of Financial Resources
The supply partners in GSP model were expected to have the financial strength to afford the
development cost and to wait for the Dreamliner deliveries before they receive their
15

compensation. The extensive delays, however, exhausted the financial abilities of some of the
supply partners to support the reworks and extra costs of the program. Entering a period of
global economic downturn added to the problems of financially troubled suppliers. On the other
hand, Boeing, who had time constrained obligations to its customers, was pushing the supply
partners to increase their investment in the program to expedite the production. This was, of
course, beyond the means of some of the supply partners.
For example, Vought and Global Aeronautica6 built two facilities in Charleston, South
Carolina, dedicated to Dreamliner program. To resolve the supply chain problems and increase
the production capacity, these facilities needed additional investments. However, Vought and
Global Aeronautica, who had already invested heavily in the program and did not receive any
income due to the extended delays, were hesitant to pour more money into these facilities.
Therefore, Boeing was left with no choice but to buy the facilities7.

5.5. Labor union strike
A 58-day strike by 27,000 Boeing workers caused further delays in the already delayed
Dreamliner program. One of the major issues in this dispute (the second time in three years) was
the employees’ concern about their job security, which had been intensified by the extensive
outsourcing in the Dreamliner program. While Boeing’s employees felt that they were losing
their jobs to outside suppliers, at the same time, they were asked to use their considerable
experience and expertise to fix all the unfinished works which the inexperienced suppliers failed
to complete (travelled work).
The strike, which was the longest in 13 years, cost Boeing $100 million per day in deferred
revenue. The strike ended when the machinist union secured a four year contract in which
Boeing offered a 15% pay rise over the four year period of the contract. Boeing included this
extra pay as an incentive in the contract to gain flexibility and prevent further obstruction by the
workers to its future outsourcing plans (Lunsford, 2008).
After the two month strike, Boeing decided to open a second assembly line in South Carolina
to ramp up production for its delayed Dreamliner program. The company decided to open the
6

Global Aeronautica was a 50%-50% joint venture between Alenia Aeronautica and Vought Aircraft Industries.

7

Dominic Gates, interview with authors, Jun.4, 2010.
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new facility to isolate the program from potential disruptions by its unionized workforce in
Washington State. The South Carolina plant had the advantages of no labor union problem,
relatively lower labor cost, and being closer to the two other Dreamliner production facilities
(which originally belonged to Vought and Global Aeronautica). In this way, Boeing wanted to
ensure Dreamliner production remains continuous without any labor disruption to meet the
production goal of manufacturing 10 airplanes per month by the end of 2013 (Ostrower, 2010).

6. Analysis
Many interconnected factors played influential roles in turning the Dreamliner outsourcing
program into an operational and financial nightmare. Using our conceptual framework, we try to
show how the interaction of these factors led to the delays and extra costs. Table 1 shows the
influential factors for each of the four dimensions of outsourcing, as well as the status of
associated factors in the Dreamliner program.

Who
Technical Capability

Financial Capability

Supplier Management

Talent Availability

IP Concerns

Dependency Concerns

Employee Flexibility

Very strong, possibly stronger than all other suppliers (except in a few subsystems
which have always been outsourced such as engines, avionics … )
Very strong, Boeing managed to pay an estimated $30 billion of extra costs during
almost three years of delays
Boeing was experienced in outsourcing the manufacturing but novice in outsourcing
the detailed design of the airplane sections
Boeing owned one of the largest and richest collection of experienced engineers and
technicians in this industry
Since Boeing intended to play to role of a system integrator, it was not very strict about
keeping in-house its know-how of airplane detailed design
Through its revenue sharing contracts, Boeing was not very concerned about its
dependency on supply partners
Boeing’s workforce was strongly unionized. Boeing intended to create more flexibility
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What
Complexity

Extremely complex product

Criticality for the OEM

What is outsourced was very critical

Development Cost

Very high initial investment was required

Lead Time

Usually very long for this type of product

To Whom
Technical strength
Financial strength

Evidence suggests that some of the suppliers where not up to the task
Supply partners were financially strong to make the initial investment as long as the
program was not delayed

Sub-Supplier

Problems with sub-suppliers shows that some of the supply partners were not

Management

particularly good at managing sub-suppliers

Cost advantage

Suppliers were NOT located in cheap labor or talent locations

How
Outsourcing scope

Extensive outsourcing of design and manufacturing

Contract type

Revenue sharing

Communication level
Control and Monitoring

The communication level was less than needed for the outsourcing of NPD of an
extremely complex product
Less than enough control and monitoring

Table 1 – The status of influential factors of four elements of outsourcing in the Dreamliner program
The GSP model can perfectly be justified by certain combination of the factors mentioned in
table 1. However, we will show in this section, how the interaction of other factors can, and did,
result in delays and extra costs. The combination of the following four factors could have
persuaded Boeing to follow GSP model.
1. The very high initial cost of development program,
2. Boeing’s desire to reduce the risk of initial investment,
3. Boeing’s desire to play the role of a system integrator, with greater employee flexibility,
4. The availability of supply partners with reasonable technical capability and resources,
who are willing to invest their own funds in the development of the program and wait for
a share of revenue as their compensation.
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Figure 5 - Factors which persuaded Boeing to follow the GSP model
Figure 5 shows how these factors are related to four outsourcing dimensions. The
combination of these four factors makes the GSP model almost the best model for the
development and production of the Dreamliner. However, there are other factors which should
be considered before we can have a holistic view of the outsourcing program. Below, we try to
identify main factors whose interactions caused serious problems for the program. We look at
these factors from two perspectives
•

Core competency point of view

•

Delay/extra-cost point of view

6.1. Core Competency Point of View
The old debate about what processes should be outsourced and what should be kept in-house
applies to Boeing too. However, it is not always easy to identify the core competency processes
which should be kept in-house. The approach chosen by Boeing suggests that the company
considered its main core competency to be its ability to manage the development program as a
system integrator. However, the case evidence shows that Boeing was not very accurate in
evaluating its core competency.
Historically, Boeing has shown great ability in managing mega-projects of developing new
airplanes. In the Dreamliner program, Boeing kept this project management role, as well as the
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assembly of the final product, in-house and outsourced pretty much everything else. The
Dreamliner development project, however, was not similar to the projects that Boeing had
previously experienced. There were many features of the Dreamliner program which made it
quite distinct from its predecessors: (a) the supply chain structure was multilayered and more
complex, (b) suppliers were responsible for the integrations of the major sections of the airplane,
(c) and above all, the detailed design of the airplane sections was done by the suppliers. Many of
the supply chain problems which delayed the program were clear evidence that Boeing was not
specifically experienced in managing such a project, which means the project management in
this program could hardly be Boeing’s core competency.
Prahalad and Hamel (1990), in their seminal paper, argue that “core competencies are the
collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and
integrate multiple streams of technologies.” The real core competency of Boeing, which resulted
in its successful introduction of many different airplane models in the past, seems to be Boeing’s
know-how to perform all the detailed design, engineering, and assembly of all the parts with
partial outsourcing of manufacturing process. Boeing’s another core competency is its ability to
absorb all the learning which happens when the detailed design and engineering are done
internally.
Granstrand et al (1999) argue that companies should try to create a portfolio of competencies
to remain competitive. However, they emphasize, building a new competency should not result
in the destruction or weakening of other “distinctive” or “core” technological competencies.
Boeing’s attempt to create a core competency in system integration could come with the cost of
weakening its real core competencies as we discussed above. This weakening in core
competencies, in turn, could result in the following negative impacts. See also figure 6.

Intellectual Property Concerns
Boeing, due to outsourcing detailed design, had to share with suppliers some of the unique
design knowledge and techniques which had been accumulated at Boeing through designing and
developing airplanes for almost a century. For example, a proprietary manual, “How to Build a
Commercial Airplane”, which was developed by Boeing engineers for over five decades, was
shared in large part with Tier-1 suppliers developing the Dreamliner (Nolan, 2009).
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Dependency Concerns
Boeing limited its access to the detailed design of subsystems, under GSP model. Since the
suppliers spent their own funds to design and develop the sections, they naturally retain details of
these designs as their own property.
“That means Boeing will have to depend on suppliers for any changes or
modifications in future, for the parts that will go onto the 787. Boeing has no idea
what went into the design, because they don’t own the design. It is on their
(suppliers’) computers, the design principles and the calculations are all with them
(suppliers) and they own it legally and intellectually,”
explains Stan Sorscher8.
Future troubleshooting could also be a more complicated task, especially if the problem involves
two or more sections developed by different suppliers. As an example, in July 2009 Boeing
announced that the joint between the center wing box and the wing faced a stress related
problem. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries had developed the wing and Fuji Heavy Industries had
developed the center wing box and Boeing had developed the interface. Since neither of the
suppliers owned the interface and nor did Boeing have access to the design of the parts, Boeing
had to re-test the already completed Dreamliner and bear the cost of over runs (Gates, 2009).
Similar problems might happen if Boeing wants to make any modification or extend the features
of the airplane.

Transferring the learning process
The ownership of the design and manufacturing of high value-added parts and processes can be
considered as the source of core competency for a company. Aerospace industry, and in
particular commercial aviation, has a very steep learning curve due to the extreme complexity of
the products. That is, the first airplane of a new model costs many times more than the tenth
airplane, for instance, since the processes can be improved dramatically by learning how to do
things properly. By outsourcing the engineering, manufacturing, and integration of the major
sections of the Dreamliner to outside suppliers, Boeing let this learning process, and the
corresponding high value-added functions, transfer to those suppliers.
8

Stan Sorscher, interview with authors, July 26, 2010.
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Weaker future innovation capability
The ability to innovate products depends on the ability to innovate the related processes. In other
words, when a company deals with the manufacturing processes of a product, the ability to
innovate related new processes lies within that company. These new processes, in turn, could
enable the company to manufacture the next generation of that product (Pisano and Shih, 2009).
A good example could be Boeing’s ability to introduce the Dreamliner as a composite airplane.
This could be due to Boeing’s past experience with the composite materials. Thus, when Boeing
outsourced almost all the detailed design and manufacturing of the airplane structure to outside
suppliers, the ability of future innovations in making airframe structures from composite
materials was also transferred to these suppliers. This can limit Boeing’s competitiveness in
introducing future generations of composite airplanes.

Figure 6 - Factors which could result in weakened future competitiveness

6.2. Delay/Extra-Cost Point of View
There are several factors whose interactions in the Dreamliner program resulted in the extensive
delay and huge extra costs. Figure 7 shows the interaction of the main factors in the four
outsourcing dimensions. Blow, we briefly explain these interactions.
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Figure 7 – How the interaction of different outsourcing element can be problematic
Less Than Enough Monitoring and Communication
Although Boeing had enough experience in how to outsource manufacturing, it was relatively
inexperienced in outsourcing detailed design. After decades of designing airplanes, Boeing had
developed practices which were keys in turning it into a successful airplane designer and
developer. Boeing was so used to knowing and implementing these practices that it failed to
understand that these are not common knowledge among its supply partners. As Lynn Lunsford9
metaphorically puts it, these practices have become part of Boeing’s DNA. For instance, it has
been a common practice in Boeing that all parts of detailed design are reviewed by a Designated
Engineering Reviewer (DER) to guarantee the consistency of different parts of the detailed
design. Boeing did not articulate this practice to its suppliers and it was surprising for Boeing
that some of the suppliers had failed to have their designs approved by a DER. Since Boeing

9

Lynn J Lunsford, interview with authors, July 15, 2010.
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expected its supply partners to perform this task, many of Boeing’s DER had already been either
retired or laid off10. So, Boeing was not able to address the problem very quickly.
Boeing’s lack of experience in outsourcing design resulted in an insufficient level of
monitoring and communication with supply partners. Outsourcing the design of an extremely
complicated product to multiple parties needs a whole new level of monitoring and
communication which is not comparable to what Boeing used to have. Furthermore, the product
design was also unprecedented due to new materials and technologies, which brought along its
own surprises to the project. This was another source of uncertainty which necessitates a more
rigorous control and monitoring mechanism for the project. This fact was reminded to Boeing by
a senior advisory group which consists of retired Boeing’s managers whom the company invited
back in 2010 to analyze Boeing’s challenges. This is how Joseph Sutter11, the unofficial leader of
the advisory group, addresses the problem of improper monitoring and communication with
suppliers in the Dreamliner program:
“You better damn well have a high percentage of Boeing guys there (at supplier
locations) looking over their shoulders” (Sanders, 2010).

Human Resource Related factors
The successful development of an airplane depends heavily on having experienced and skillful
workers, technicians, and engineers especially in an industry whose learning curve is very steep.
So, it is not just a good design which leads to a successful product, it is also the learning process
which happens throughout the development program. This learning process is feasible when the
technical teams possess the proper skills and understand this culture.
Being in this business for almost a century, Boeing has nurtured generations of skillful
employees, who developed and manufactured many successful airplane models. Boeing’s
workforce and the accumulated knowledge which resides with them seem to be the company’s
real core competency.

10

Lynn J Lunsford, interview with authors, July 15, 2010.

11

Joseph Sutter is the most renowned living veteran of Boeing and is considered as a legendary figure in the
aerospace world. He was the head of the design team of the world’s first Jumbo-Jet, B747.
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Boeing workforce proved their competency again, in the Dreamliner program, by fixing all
the unfinished travelled work which suppliers failed to complete during the early stages of the
program. As another piece of evidence, among the very few sections of the Dreamliner which
was delivered, relatively, on time and on budget was the vertical fin which was designed and
manufactured by Boeing’s employees.
In the Dreamliner program, however, Boeing weakened the role of its experienced employees
by relying mostly on its global supply partners. This approach not only put this valuable resource
on the side, but also created a sense of job insecurity among the employees; one of the major
concerns in the machinists strike in 2008.
“One of the biggest issues of the strike was the continued outsourcing of the company
and it remains an issue that it is our work (which is going out to suppliers),”
says Connie Kelliher12, IAM13 spokesperson.

Problem Solving
In many of the reported supply chain delays, it seems that the problems surfaced at a very late
stage, when it was very difficult to deal with them. The fastener shortages as well as the defects
in the mid fuselage are both examples of the problems which could have been detected and
resolved much sooner. However, they surfaced when there were no other choices but to delay
the program and spend a lot more money than it was really needed. The reason could be either
lack of a proper monitoring system, or lack of a proper problem solving culture which reacts to
the signals of trouble in a timely manner. In our studies we found evidence showing that there
has not been a close relationship between the top management and the body of the company. The
most obvious evidence could be two labor union strikes in three years (in 2005 and in 2008).
Lack of trust and/or a good relationship between top management and the body of the
company could be a barrier that prevents a smooth and timely flow of information from those
who can detect the problems to those who can make the decisions to resolve the problems.

12

Connie Kelliher, interview with authors, July 19, 2010.

13

IAM District 751 is the International Association for Machinists and Aerospace workers of Washington State
District representing active and retired aerospace workers at Boeing Industries in Washington State.
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Another reason for poor problem solving could be lack of a mechanism which encourages the
supply partner to share, as soon as possible, any trouble which could cause a delay. In such
situations, the suppliers usually tend to postpone the sharing of the unpleasant news.
“Many of the delays on the 787 program have come strictly because suppliers, who
were supposed to raise their hands for help, were reluctant to do so. They had to deal
with their egos and legal reasons,”
says Lynn Lunsford14.

Suboptimal supplier selection
In the GSP model, only those suppliers could participate who had the financial capability of
investing their money up front in the program and willing to wait until Boeing sells the airplane
before they receive any payment. This was a strong and limiting prerequisite. Therefore, the
technical capability of suppliers received secondary priority. This could potentially result in
suboptimal selection of suppliers from a product development point of view, which is supported
by the existence of a few very problematic supply partners in this program.

Supply Partners’ Incentives
One inherent problem within this supply chain model is that when the program starts to deviate
from its schedule, it can deteriorate the participants’ incentives in doing their best. Assume a
scenario in which the program is delayed because of problems at one supplier. Now if another
supplier spends a lot of resources to deliver on time, it will not gain anything. In fact, in this
case, it would be in supplier’s best interest to spend as little as possible and be just slightly better
than the worst supplier, who would endure all the blames and bad publicities. If every supplier
knows the progress of all other suppliers, in a “perfect information” situation, this behavior
would not hurt the program. However, due to suppliers’ imperfect information, each one of them
decides about its effort level based on guessing the progress level of the others. This behavior
can seriously hurt the program. Not all suppliers necessarily behave in this way, however, the
general setup works against suppliers’ incentive to do their best. What intensified this problem in

14

Lynn J Lunsford, interview with authors, July 15, 2010.
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the Dreamliner program was that the supply partners owned the design of the outsourced section.
So, they had strong bargaining powers and could not be replaced easily.

Hidden Costs
“Back in 2003, the odds were against the program … As a result, the only way you
get this thing (the Dreamliner program) going is if you promise to limit the
development costs to a tiny fraction of what they should have been. The only way to
do that was to develop an extremely unrealistic supplier model,”
says Richard Aboulafia15.
In 2003, Allan Mullaly (then CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes) managed to get the
project through, against some opposition from the Board of Directors. To do so, Mullaly had to
reduce the financial risk of the project by reducing the required upfront investment and spreading
the risk among various supply chain partners. What the company overlooked was the fact that the
new GSP model devised a much more complicated supply chain and engaged the company in a
program with little previous experience. This meant the program had to endure a much higher
level of operational risks. That is, the new GSP model had considerable expected hidden cost.
The history of the program suggests that Boeing underestimated the operational risks in the
program schedule and resources. On the other hand, the operational risks and financial risks are
not independent of each other. When the company faced all the realized operational risks, they
brought back all the financial risks along with them and all the expected hidden costs surfaced.

6.3. Consequences
The interaction of the abovementioned factors resulted in Boeing’s longest delayed program with
the total investment mounting to almost 3 times the initial expected budget (Gates, 2011). The
delays resulted in (a) poor stock performance (see figure 4), (b) deferred revenue, (c) penalty
payments to customers for late delivery, (d) unscheduled (direct or indirect) payments to
suppliers who delivered their sections on time (e) order cancellations, and (f) a drop in Boeing’s
credit worthiness by credit rating agencies (Siew, 2009). These delays, on the other hand, caused
the program to enter a period of national and global economic downturn, which in turn became a
15

Richard Aboulafia, interview with authors, June 22, 2010.
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problem for suppliers who invested heavily in the program and did not receive any payments.
Therefore, the suppliers’ financial problems become another source of trouble for the supply
chain. See figure 8.

Figure 8 – The consequences of the development problems and delays
Observing these consequences, Boeing might revise its GSP model for its future programs.
"We outsourced too much. ... We didn't consider the extent of the risk we'd take on by
going outside," said Jim Albaugh, CEO-Boeing Commercial Airplanes (Gates, 2010).
"We will make sure the voice of the engineers is much more involved in the decision
making as we go forward."

7. Conclusion and Insights
One can hardly find a major development program in aerospace industry which has been
delivered in time or on budget. Due to extreme complexity of the products and very high
standards of this industry, each development program has its own surprises. The extended delay
and huge extra costs of Dreamliner program, however, was unprecedented in the history of
Boeing. As we discussed, the interactions of many different factors resulted in these delays and
extra-costs.
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We first highlighted that the new outsourcing model can be fairly justified by looking at
factors such as high initial development costs and the tendency to reduce the initial investment
risk. However, after mapping all major factors, we analyzed the root causes of delays and extra
costs within a network of interconnected factors.
Our conceptual framework is built upon the existing outsourcing literature which mostly
focuses on the impact of different factors on the outsourcing performance in a relatively isolated
way. Our framework, instead of focusing on limited number of factors, tries to focus on the
interaction of all influential factors in four dimensions of outsourcing (Who, to Whom, What,
How). In spite of its simplicity, this conceptual framework is sufficiently comprehensive to
analyze complex outsourcing programs.
Although this case study focuses on the outsourcing of the detailed design and engineering of
a commercial airplane, the insights can be applicable to a wider range of outsourcing situations
which have similar characteristics. In fact, the following managerial insights can be concluded
from this case study.
1- Safeguard the real core competencies: An accurate evaluation of company’s core
competencies is needed before an outsourcing strategy can be laid out. An outsourcing
program should not threaten company’s core competency. As we showed in this case,
Boeing’s decision to outsource almost all the detailed design and manufacturing
weakened its core competency and resulted in extended delays and extra cost.
2- Appreciate the value of in-house detailed design and manufacturing: In an industry with
a very steep learning curve, detailed design and manufacturing present precious core
competencies that is worth maintaining. Companies who are really good at manufacturing
tend to be good at innovation, whereas companies who outsource their manufacturing
often find that innovation has followed (Plambeck and Taylor, 2005). Moreover,
Outsourcing the detailed design can cause unexpected problems down the road with
respect to intellectual property.
3- Consider all the influential factors: There are many factors which play influential roles in
the success or failure of an outsourcing program. Therefore, an outsourcing decision
should not be made based on only few selected factors which support a certain course of
action. A Holistic consideration of these factors and their possible interactions is needed,
in particular when dealing with an extremely complex product.
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4- Be mindful of changes: Outsourcing of a complex product or service requires certain
capabilities and processes in the outsourcing firm. A major change in what is being
outsourced, therefore, might require different sets of competencies. Building
competencies in outsourcing detailed design and becoming a system integrator is not a
trivial task and need time and effort. Since core competencies are built through a process
of continuous improvement and enhancement, it may take a decade or longer to build a
new core competency (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). The transition from fully in-house
detailed design to fully outsourcing of detailed design needs time and special
consideration. We believe some of the major challenges in this program might have been
eased by
a. making more gradual changes, i.e. outsource the detailed design of very limited
number of sections to most capable and reliable suppliers, while performing the
rest of the detailed design and engineering in-house,
b. making much stronger preparation for addressing the potential challenges of
implementing a new approach (GSP model) or technology (composite airframe),
e.g. a much stronger control/coordination over the supplier partners,
c. considering (more thoroughly) the potential surprises in the schedule and budget
of the program.
5- Consider the hidden cost of outsourcing:
It often appears to be cheaper to outsource a process, and it usually ends up being more
expensive. Although any outsourcing program brings certain benefits, there are
associated hidden costs which inevitably come along with the benefits. These hidden
costs can be viewed as the risks of outsourcing program. It is essential to try to identify
and quantify the potential hidden costs, utilize ways to minimize them, and have some
contingency plan. Based on the existing results in the outsourcing literature, exhibit 1
shows main factors which increase the expected hidden cost in an outsourcing program.
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The expected hidden costs of an outsourcing program are increasing in these factors:
-

Product complexity [what]

-

Geographical distance [to whom]

-

Cultural and legal differences [to whom]

-

Cultural differences [to whom]

-

Regulatory differences [to whom]

-

Contract vagueness which could be due to [how]:
o Lack of clear performance measure
o Lack clear definition of project scope

-

Difficulty or lack of monitoring [how]

-

Lack of OEM’s experience in outsourcing what is to be outsourced [who]

-

Lack of suppliers’ technical capabilities [to whom]

-

Misalignment of suppliers’ incentives with OEM’s goals [how & to whom]

-

Closeness of outsource function to OEM’s core competency (IP transfer)
[who & what]

-

Rate of evolution in what is outsourced (change in product features or
processes) [what]

Exhibit 1 – Hidden cost factors
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